North Dakota Law Review
Volume 87

Number 3

Article 5

1-1-2011

Sentencing and Punishment—Sentencing Guidelines: The
Sentencing Reform Act Precludes Courts from Lengthening a
Prison Sentence Solely to Foster Offender Rehabilitation
Shanna L. Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brown, Shanna L. (2011) "Sentencing and Punishment—Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing Reform
Act Precludes Courts from Lengthening a Prison Sentence Solely to Foster Offender Rehabilitation," North
Dakota Law Review: Vol. 87 : No. 3 , Article 5.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol87/iss3/5

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT—SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT PRECLUDES
COURTS FROM LENGTHENING A PRISON SENTENCE
SOLELY TO FOSTER OFFENDER REHABILITATION
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. CT. 2382 (2011)
ABSTRACT
In Tapia v. United States, the Supreme Court held 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)
prohibits sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison sentence
to promote an offender’s rehabilitation. The Court concluded the plain text
of § 3582(a) tells sentencing courts that imprisonment is an inappropriate
means of promoting rehabilitation. This limitation applied not only to the
decision to impose a prison term, but also to determining its length.
Therefore, the Court held the district court erred by giving Tapia a longer
sentence so she could complete a drug treatment program provided by the
U.S. Bureau of Prisons. The Court noted, however, § 3582(a) allows
sentencing courts to discuss the programs available in prison and their
benefits. Tapia will significantly impact future sentencing decisions. In
particular, this ruling overturns the law of the Eighth Circuit, which held
sentencing courts could extend, but not impose, a prison term for
rehabilitative purposes. In addition, recent First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit
decisions suggest there is an emerging split on Tapia’s application to
sentencing upon supervised release.
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FACTS

On January 14, 2008, after a border agent discovered two illegal aliens
hidden in the modified gas tank of Alejandra Tapia’s vehicle, Tapia and her
friend, Tinamarie Debenedetto, were arrested at the San Ysidro, California
border crossing.1 A grand jury indicted Tapia for smuggling illegal aliens

1. Brief for United States Supporting Vacatur at 4-5, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382
(2011) (No. 10-5400). Earlier that day, Tapia agreed to drive the aliens from Mexico to the
United States. Id. at 4. Tapia was later given a Jeep to accomplish this task. Id. To allow Tapia
to secret individuals in the gas tank compartment, the Jeep had been converted to run on an
alternative fuel source. Id. Before departing on the journey, Tapia helped fit the aliens into the
modified gas tank compartment. Id.
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for financial gain and without presentation.2 Following the indictment, the
district court released her on bond pending further proceedings.3 After
Tapia missed a court date, a bench warrant was issued for her arrest.4 Six
months later, officers found Tapia with methamphetamine, a sawed-off
shotgun, and stolen mail she planned to use for identity theft.5
At sentencing, the district court calculated a Federal Sentencing
Guideline6 range of forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment for
Tapia’s offense.7 In determining the length of Tapia’s sentence, the district
court considered several factors, including Tapia’s history of physical and
sexual abuse, her need for correctional treatment, the seriousness of her
offense, and the need for deterrence.8 The district court sentenced Tapia to
fifty-one months of imprisonment, with three years of supervised release to
follow.9 In justifying this sentence, the district court stressed the need for
the sentence to be long enough for Tapia to qualify for and finish the U.S.
Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) 500-hour Residential Drug Abuse Program
(RDAP).10
When the district court imposed the sentence, Tapia made no
objections.11 The sentencing judge recommended Tapia be placed in
Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Dublin,12 “where they ha[d] the
facilities to really help her.”13 The BOP, however, placed Tapia in a
different facility and she never enrolled in RDAP.14 On appeal, Tapia
argued the district court abused its discretion by lengthening her sentence so

2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
4. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (No. 10-5400).
5. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 5.
6. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide federal judges with a set of advisory
sentencing ranges for federal offenses. See infra Part II.C; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2, available at http://www.
ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf.
7. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385.
8. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 4-5; Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 6-7.
9. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385.
10. Id. RDAP is a nine- to twelve-month drug treatment program. JANET HINTON, BUREAU
OF PRISONS RESIDENTIAL DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM REFERENCE CHART 1 (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/2009%0RDAP%20Chart.pdf. Ordinarily, the offender must have at
least twenty-four months remaining on his or her sentence in order to be considered for the
program. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS 9, 11 (2009),
available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5330_011.pdf.
11. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385.
12. FCI Dublin is located in Dublin, California. FCI Dublin, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://
www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/dub/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
13. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2391.
14. Id.; see also Brief for Stephanos Bibas et. al. as Amicus Curae by Invitation of the Court,
Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (No. 10-5400).
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she could complete RDAP.15 According to Tapia, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)
precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison sentence
to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.16 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
Tapia’s sentence.17 Citing its previous holding in United States v. Duran,18
the Ninth Circuit held § 3582(a) only prohibits a sentencing court from
considering rehabilitation when making the initial decision to incarcerate.19
Once that decision is made, however, a court can consider rehabilitative
factors in calculating the length of the prison sentence.20
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Throughout American history, reformers have run the gamut of
rehabilitation methods and strategies.21 In the early nineteenth century,
reformers believed they could rehabilitate offenders through isolation and
hard labor.22 By the 1950s, activists thought individualized treatment and
correctional programs could purge the offender of his criminal tendencies.23
Each reform effort, however, faced the relentless criticism that the treatment
programs were not working.24 By the 1970s, policymakers rejected the
rehabilitative model, which set the stage for the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).25 Thus, an understanding of the
statutory context of this Act requires a review of American history.
First, this section will briefly discuss the evolution of American prison
programs, leading up to the sentencing reform movement of the mid1970s.26 Second, this section will track the legislative history of the Act,
specifically focusing on the role of rehabilitation in incarceration.27 Third,
this section will provide a brief overview of the relevant law regarding the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386.
Id.
Id.
37 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1994).
Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386 (citing Duran, 37 F.3d at 561).
Id.
Michael Braswell, Correctional Treatment and the Human Spirit, in CORRECTIONAL
COUNSELING AND REHABILITATION 3, 4 (Patricia Van Voorhis et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997).
22. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 79
(1993).
23. See LARRY E. SULLIVAN, THE PRISON REFORM MOVEMENT: FORLORN HOPE 61-62
(1990).
24. See Francis T. Cullen & Brandon K. Applegate, Introduction to OFFENDER
REHABILITATION, at xiii, xiv-xvi (Francis T. Cullen & Brandon K. Applegate eds., 1997).
25. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-66 (1989) (briefly discussing the
genesis of the SRA of 1984).
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines.28 Finally, this section will layout the underlying circuit split29 leading up to Tapia v. United States.30
A. THE HISTORY OF REHABILITATION IN AMERICAN PRISONS
The Quakers were the earliest Americans to embrace the idea that
offenders were capable of self-reformation.31 Inspired by this belief, in
1787, a group of Quakers formed the first prison reform organization, the
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons
(Philadelphia Prison Society), which sought to improve the miserable
conditions in the public prisons and jails.32 Urged by the Philadelphia
Prison Society, the state legislature converted the Walnut Street Jail into its
state prison, which was the first penitentiary in the United States.33
The Walnut Street Prison opened its doors in 1790.34 Although most
inmates were housed in large night rooms, violent offenders were placed in
solitary confinement.35 To pass the time, inmates could participate in
various vocational programs, such as shoemaking, weaving, and polishing
marble.36 In addition to these vocational programs, the Walnut Street
Prison provided inmates with medical care and religious services.37 By
1798, inmates also had access to a school, which offered reading, writing,
and arithmetic lessons.38 Reformers hoped the combination of labor and
reflection would make offenders both contrite and penitent.39 Despite the
Walnut Street Prison’s initial success,40 overcrowding and prison violence
forced reformers to dispense with this system.41
Unfazed by this failure, reformers moved to build massive facilities
capable of isolating and reforming inmates.42 Both Pennsylvania43 and
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
See SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 5.
See JOHN W. ROBERTS, REFORM AND RETRIBUTION: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
AMERICAN PRISONS 24 (1997).
33. Id. at 26-27.
34. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 6.
35. Id.
36. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 27.
37. See SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 6.
38. Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, Walnut Street Jail, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS
796, 800 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996).
39. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 26-27.
40. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 6.
41. See Grimes, supra note 38, at 801; Matthew W. Meskell, An American Resolution: The
History of Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REV. 839, 847-50 (1999).
42. See THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF
CONTROL 53 (2000).
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New York44 developed rival prison systems that would theoretically isolate
and reform offenders.45 While both systems sought to separate prisoners
from one another, the Pennsylvania system took isolation to its extreme.46
For the entire length of their sentence, prisoners stayed in their individual
cells where they were expected to eat, work, and sleep.47 New York’s
Auburn system, on the other hand, took a more moderate approach to isolation.48 Under the Auburn system, prisoners were only isolated at night.49
During the day, prisoners could eat and work together in congregate workshops, but prison policies required prisoners to complete their activities in
total silence.50
As these facilities filled to their capacity, however, it became
impossible to maintain the isolation and discipline these two systems
required.51 To keep the inmate population at a manageable level, prisons
pardoned large groups of inmates every year.52 Nevertheless, the recidivism rate of these released prisoners continued to rise.53 Penitentiaries
were clearly in need of an overhaul.54
With the Auburn system falling into ruin, the New York Prison
Association commissioned Enoch Cobb Wines and Theodore Dwight to
survey and evaluate penitentiaries in the United States and Canada.55 In
1867, Wines and Dwight compiled their discoveries and recommendations

43. See J.M. MOYNAHAN & EARLE K. STEWART, THE AMERICAN JAIL: ITS DEVELOPMENT
GROWTH 37 (1980). Pennsylvania’s first penitentiary, based on the separate system model,
was the Western Penitentiary in Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania’s second penitentiary, Eastern
Penitentiary, was later built at Cherry Hill in Pittsburgh. Id.
44. Id. (stating Auburn Prison was built in 1823).
45. See ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 31.
46. See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 118
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995); see also BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42,
at 53. For example, officials hooded inmates when they entered jail, when they left their cells, and
when they were eventually released. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 53.
47. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 82 (1971).
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY, supra note 46, at
170. By 1865, three to four inmates were living in a cell designed for one. BLOMBERG &
LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 58. For example, in 1867, New York’s legislature reported that onethird of its inmates were housed two to a cell. Id.
52. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 58.
53. See NICOLE HAHN RAFTER & DEBRA L. STANLEY, PRISONS IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 7 (1999).
54. See id.
55. Id.
AND
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and published the Report on the Prisons and Reformatories of the United
States and Canada.56 While they could not find an American penitentiary
system deserving praise, Wines and Dwight enthusiastically endorsed the
Irish prison system, developed by Sir Walter Crofton.57 Under the Irish
system, inmates advanced through a series of grades, which, depending on
their good conduct, led to their release.58
Wines and Dwight shared their recommendations and insights at the
1870 Cincinnati Conference, along with other penal reform advocates, such
as Franklin Sanborn and Zebulon Brockway.59 To the conference attendees, the Irish prison system was an appealing alternative to the Auburn and
Pennsylvania prison systems.60 At the conclusion of the conference, the
National Congress of Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline adopted the
“Declaration of Principles,” which included “the establishment of adult
reformatories, in conjunction with (1) the indeterminate sentence, (2) a
mark/classification system, (3) intensive academic and vocational instruction, (4) constructive labor, (5) humane disciplinary methods, and (6)
parole.”61
When Zebulon Brockway became the superintendent of the Elmira
Reformatory in New York in 1876, he put these principles to the test.62 In
the Elmira Reformatory, inmates had access to a variety of educational
programs taught by college professors, lawyers, and public school principals.63 For the less astute, Elmira offered vocational programs such as
“tailor cutting, plumbing, telegraphy, and printing.”64 To incentivize
prisoners to reform themselves, Brockway adopted a graded system, which
rewarded inmates’ good behavior and participation in vocational and
educational programs with new privileges and the possibility of early
release on parole.65 Due to flawed architecture and scant resources, Elmira
Reformatory was unable to achieve its sweeping aspirations of prisoner
reformation.66

56. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 17.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 17-18.
59. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 70.
60. Rotman, supra note 51, at 173.
61. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 70-71.
62. See EDGARDO ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW ON THE REHABILITATION
OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 40 (1990).
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 40.
66. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 65.
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During the same period, New York passed legislation providing for
indeterminate sentences.67
The statute gave “managers of . . .
reformator[ies]” the discretion to set the length of the offender’s sentence,
but the sentence had to be within the maximum statutory term for the
offense.68 Courts, on the other hand, were precluded from limiting the
duration of the sentence.69 In other words, an offender had two options:
“be cured, or be kept.”70
In 1910, Congress established a federal parole system, which
authorized the use of indeterminate sentencing.71 Under the new system,
Congress, the judge, and the parole board each played a role in determining
the length of an offender’s sentence.72 Congress set the maximum sentence
an offender could serve, the judge imposed a sentenced within the statutory
range for the offense, and the parole board determined when the offender
would actually be released.73 Unlike Congress and the parole board, the
judge had the power to sentence offenders to no time at all.74 With the
passage of the National Probation Act of 1925, aside from crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, a sentencing judge could opt to suspend
a sentence.75
In the 1950s, the “medical model” became the method of choice among
policymakers.76 Under this model, penologists viewed criminality as a
disease, which could be treated or cured through individualized treatment
programs.77 As part of this system, many states had “diagnostic centers,”
where offenders would be quarantined and classified before being placed
into an institution.78 Based on these classifications, officials placed inmates
in individualized treatment programs, which could include educational
programs, work release, group counseling, and even specialized living units
designed to treat disruptive inmates, drug addicts, and sex offenders.79 Like
67. See Jeanine M. Schupbach, New York’s System of Indeterminate Sentencing and Parole:
Should It Be Abolished?, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 403 (1985).
68. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 18 (1998).
69. Id.
70. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 73 (citing Martin B. Miller, At Hard Labor:
Rediscovering the 19th Century Prison, in PUNISHMENT AND PENAL DISCIPLINE 79 (T. Platt & P.
Takgai eds., 1980)).
71. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 19.
72. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989).
73. Id.
74. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 19.
75. Id.
76. Braswell, supra note 21, at 4.
77. Id.
78. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 63; see also ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 171.
79. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 172.
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the states, the BOP provided several specialized programs: “Asklepieion,”
which sought to promote self-help attitudes through transactional analysis;80
“CASE,” which encouraged young offenders to succeed academically; the
Special Treatment and Rehabilitative Training unit (START), which
incentivized the most disruptive inmates to maintain good behavior; and
several drug abuse treatment units, which were established by the Narcotic
Addicts Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (NARA).81
While the rehabilitative ideal enjoyed immense support, by the mid1970s, many experts started to question the efficacy of the model.82 One
study by Robert Martinson and his colleagues reviewed 231 studies of
correctional programs that had been conducted from 1945 to 1967, focusing
on these programs’ effects on recidivism.83 The programs scrutinized
included vocational training, educational remediation, and medical programs.84 After reviewing these studies, Martinson and his research team
concluded, “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts
that [had] been reported . . . had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”85 In
sum, Martinson believed there was “little reason to hope that we have in
fact found a sure way of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation.”86
This report was the tipping point for liberals and conservatives who
already harbored negative sentiments towards the rehabilitation model.87
Liberals argued racial discrimination in sentencing was an epidemic.88
Further, liberals contended the uncertainty of these sentences was breeding

80. Transactional analysis (TA) involved a TA leader guiding a group of inmates through
script analysis, in which inmates identify the effects of their negative thoughts. CLEMENS
BARTOLLAS, INTRODUCTION TO CORRECTIONS 323 (1981). If willing, an inmate could
participate in a goal-centered treatment regimen that was aimed at helping inmates effectively
manage self-defeating thoughts. Id. The TA program used in the Federal Penitentiary at Marion,
Illinois was named Asklepieion in reference to the “temple erected in honor of Asklepios, the
Greek god of healing.” Id.
81. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 173. Under the NARA, if an offender was “likely to be
rehabilitated through treatment,” the sentencing court could place the offender into the custody of
the Attorney General for treatment. See Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-793, § 4252, 80 Stat. 1438, 1443 (1966), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 218(a)(6), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (1984). If the offender was placed in the Attorney
General’s custody, the offender’s treatment would last for an indeterminate period of no more than
ten years. See id. § 4253.
82. See Katie Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1993).
83. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
reprinted in OFFENDER REHABILITATION, supra note 24, at 3, 5.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id. at 30.
87. Cullen & Applegate, supra note 24, at xv.
88. CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN
PUNISHMENT 220 (2002).
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anxiety and unrest in the inmate population.89 Conservatives, on the other
hand, focused on the disparate treatment of offenders who had committed
similar offenses.90 Because of judges’ unfettered discretion, sentences did
not correlate to the seriousness of the offense, which often led to unjust
results.91 Both liberals and conservatives agreed, however, that rehabilitation, as a sentencing rationale, had failed.92
Although several notable organizations and commissions made
proposals for reform,93 the most prominent and staunch critic of indeterminate sentencing during this movement was Marvin E. Frankel, a federal
district judge in New York City.94 Frankel bewailed that indeterminate
sentencing should be “terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes
devotion to the rule of law.”95 Frankel called for the legislature to create an
independent sentencing authority that would establish guideline sentences
and promulgate rules for judges to follow.96 Frankel’s criticism, coupled
with ongoing federal criminal code reform efforts, paved the way for the
SRA.97
B. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
The SRA can be traced to a 1974 Yale seminar on sentencing.98 Each
month, members of this seminar would meet and discuss the problems with
the current sentencing scheme and make recommendations for reform.99
The monthly sessions culminated in a book, which included a detailed
proposal for the creation of sentencing guidelines and the creation of an

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. TODD R. CLEAR, GEORGE F. COLE, & MICHAEL D. REISIG, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 2
(2003).
93. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 32. The Model Penal Code, drafted by the
American Legal Institute (ALI), provided for moderate changes in judicial sentencing. Id.
Although the Code retained rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, the ALI conceded the prison
setting was not conducive to rehabilitating. Id. Likewise, the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency promulgated the Model Sentencing Act, which sought to bring order to the
sentencing process. Id. For example, the Act mandated that judges articulate reasons and factual
bases for a sentence. Id. Similarly, the Brown Commission, enacted by President Lyndon B.
Johnson, argued for appellate review of sentences. Id.
94. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 228.
95. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972).
96. Id. at 122.
97. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 37.
98. See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forwards, Steps
Backwards, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 172 (1995); see also Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 230.
99. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Preface to TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING
SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM, at ix (1977).
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independent sentencing commission.100 Although the proposal preserved
rehabilitation as a sentencing goal, the authors stressed their “wariness of
most past institutional efforts to rehabilitate offenders.”101 This manuscript
became the foundation for Senate Bill 2966, a sentencing reform bill
introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy in 1975.102 Despite the
inclusion of their proposals in the bill, the Yale authors criticized Senate
Bill 2966 for its many shortcomings, including the bill’s “fail[ure] to define
its sentencing goals clearly” and its lack of specific guidance for sentencing
judges.103
After joining forces with Senator John McClellan of Arkansas, Senator
Kennedy re-introduced the bill as Senate Bill 1437, which primarily
focused on criminal code reform, but also included sentencing provisions.104 Like its predecessor, the bill did not distinguish between the four
sentencing philosophies—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.105 The only clear guidance on the goals of sentencing was the prohibition against prison sentences based on rehabilitative considerations.106
However, even this prohibition would be ineffective “in an exceptional case
in which imprisonment appears to be the sole means of achieving such
purpose and in which the court makes specific findings as to that fact.”107
The accompanying Senate Report further clarified that “this approach to
rehabilitation efforts is to be avoided as much as possible.”108
After the bill failed to pass the House, in 1980, both houses of
Congress developed and reported a bill that included sentencing
provisions.109 Senate Bill 1722, introduced by Senator Kennedy and
Senator Strom Thurmond, removed the previous bill’s exception permitting
judges to impose an indeterminate prison sentence for rehabilitative

100. Id.
101. PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM:
AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 47 (1977). The authors noted the circumstances in which an
imprisonment term could be used for rehabilitative purposes was limited. Id. Such a sentence
would “be justified only if it [was] more likely than not that the incarceration and its
accompanying rehabilitative programs [would] actually succeed in ‘rehabilitating’ the offender.”
Id. Moreover, the authors enumerated several factors the court would have to consider before
imposing an imprisonment term for this purpose. Id.
102. KENNEDY, supra note 99, at ix.
103. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 230.
104. Id. at 233.
105. Id. at 239.
106. Id. at 241 (citing S. 1437, 95th Cong. § 124 (2d Sess. 1978) (proposed tit. 18, § 994(j))).
107. Id. (quoting S. 1437, 95th Cong. § 124 (1st Sess. 1977) (proposed tit. 18, 994(j))).
108. S. REP. NO. 95-605, at 1166 (1978).
109. See Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 225.
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purposes.110 As Senator Kennedy commented, Congress hotly debated the
eradication of indeterminate sentencing.111 Ultimately, “complete elimination” won.112 In contrast, House Bill 6915 did not remove rehabilitation as
a goal of sentencing.113 Instead, the House contended rehabilitation was a
permissible sentencing goal.114 Nevertheless, the House warned courts to
“not give primary consideration to the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation when deciding whether to incarcerate the offender.”115 Both of
these bills failed to pass both houses.116
On October 4, 1984, the SRA finally passed as an omnibus funding
resolution.117 In the oft-quoted Senate Report 98-225, Congress remarked
that the indeterminate sentencing model, which tied an offender’s release to
his successful completion of treatment programs in prison, had failed.118
Several studies demonstrated the indeterminate scheme was unsuccessful.119 Congress opined parole boards knew too little about human behavior
to determine whether an offender was rehabilitated.120 In addition,
Congress feared parole boards’ and judges’ unlimited discretion would
result in widespread sentencing disparity.121
To avoid sentencing disparity and to prevent “the employment of a
term of imprisonment on the sole ground that a prison has a program that
would be of benefit to the prisoner,” Congress rejected the rehabilitation
model.122 This did not mean, however, that Congress believed prison
programs should be eliminated altogether.123 Instead, the availability of
prison programs could factor into the judge’s recommendation for a certain
facility.124 Judges could also consider rehabilitation when considering an
offender’s overall sentence, such as choosing between imposing a term of

110. Id. at 241-42 (citing S. 1722, 96th Cong. § 125 (1st Sess. 1980) (proposed tit. § 994(k)).
But see S. REP. NO. 96-553, at 1245 (1980) (caveating it is permissible for rehabilitation to be a
“secondary purpose of the sentencing”).
111. Edward M. Kennedy, Commentary—The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act and New
Sentencing Alternatives, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 423, 431 n.34 (1980).
112. Id.
113. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1396, at 435 (1980).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 436.
116. See Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 225.
117. See 130 CONG. REC. 29,730 (1984).
118. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1983).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 38.
122. Id. at 119.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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imprisonment, probation, or fine.125 Overall, Congress stressed that
rehabilitation should not be the sole purpose for imposing a term of
imprisonment, but it could be an appropriate consideration when imposing a
term such as probation or supervised release.126
C. SENTENCING UNDER THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES
As part of the SRA, Congress created the United States Sentencing
Commission, an independent agency within the judicial branch of the
federal government.127 One of the Commission’s duties is to promulgate
appropriate guideline sentences for criminal offenses.128 After United
States v. Booker,129 sentencing courts must consult these Guidelines when
determining the appropriate sentence for an offense.130 In other words, the
recommended Guidelines range is just another factor to consider when
tailoring a sentence.131
When calculating the Guidelines range for an offense, the sentencing
court follows approximately seven steps.132 First, the court selects the base
offense level that matches the offense.133 Second, the court decides whether
to increase or decrease base level based on “specific offense characteristics.”134 Third, the court will apply additional adjustments to the base
level, such as the status of the victim, the offender’s role in the crime, and
obstruction of justice.135 Fourth, the court will identify which of the six
“criminal history categories” applies to the offender.136 Fifth, after
selecting a criminal history category, the court will locate where the offense
level and criminal history category intersect on the sentencing grid, which
dictates the sentencing range for the offense.137 Sixth, the court will
consider an upward or downward departure from the sentencing range.138

125. Id. at 77.
126. Id. at 76.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006).
128. Id. § 994(a)(1).
129. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
130. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”)
131. Id.
132. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009).
133. Id. § 1B1.1(b).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 1B1.1(c).
136. Id. § 1B1.1(f).
137. Id. § 1B1.1(g).
138. Id. § 1B1.1(i).
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Finally, the court will consider any relevant policy statements, commentary,
or language within the Guidelines that may affect the sentence.139
On appellate review, there is a rebuttable presumption that a sentence
properly calculated within the Guidelines range is reasonable.140 A
departure from the Guidelines range, however, is not presumptively
unreasonable.141 When reviewing a sentence, an appellate court engages in
a two-step review of the sentence, reviewing for abuse of discretion.142
First, the appellate court will determine if the sentencing judge
committed any procedural errors, “such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
range.”143 Second, the appellate court will determine if the sentence was
substantively unreasonable “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
range.”144 For example, a sentence may be substantively unreasonable if
the district court significantly relied on impermissible factors.145 A
sentencing court abuses its discretion when it commits a procedural error or
imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence.146
D. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
After the enactment of the SRA and the promulgation of the
Sentencing Guidelines, a split emerged among circuit courts regarding the
apparent tension between 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) and § 3553(a)(2)(D).147 On
one hand, § 3582(a) admonishes sentencing courts to recognize that
“imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation.”148 On the other hand, § 3553(a)(2)(D) directs sentencing

139. Id.
140. United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007); see also United States v. Robinson,
516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting the presumption is appropriate “if the court finds that
the case before it is typical [circuit case]”).
141. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 n.3 (2007); see also United States v. SolisBermudez, 501 F.3d 882, 884-85 (8th Cir. 2007).
142. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Floyd, 458 F.3d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 2006).
146. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
147. United States v. Jimenez, 605 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2010).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006).
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courts to consider a defendant’s need for “educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”149
To reconcile these two sections, circuit courts developed two
approaches.150 The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits held § 3582(a) bars
courts from imposing a term of imprisonment to promote an offender’s
rehabilitation, but allows courts to lengthen a sentence in pursuit of this
goal.151 In reaching this conclusion, these circuit courts construed §
3582(a) to distinguish between two decisions made by a sentencing court:
whether to incarcerate and determining the length of an imprisonment
term.152 While § 3582(a)’s limiting language applied to the imposition of
an imprisonment term, it did not apply to the decision to lengthen the
sentence, whether it be within the Guidelines range or an upward
departure.153 If Congress intended otherwise, these circuit courts believed
Congress would have explicitly admonished judges to recognize “that
imprisonment or the length of imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction or rehabilitation.”154
Conversely, the Third and the D.C. Circuits held § 3582(a) prohibits
sentencing courts from using rehabilitation as a justification to impose a
sentence of imprisonment and to determine its length.155 These circuits
courts believed the perceived conflict between § 3582(a) and §
3553(a)(2)(D) was illusory.156 In fact, the Third and D.C. Circuits
contended these two sections work in harmony.157 In allowing sentencing
courts to consider rehabilitation in the overall sentencing process, these two
sections combined ensure sentencing courts will not use incarceration as a
means to facilitate rehabilitation.158 Moreover, these circuits found it
nonsensical to say the statute prohibits a court from imposing a sentence on
the basis of rehabilitation, but allows them to lengthen a sentence for that
impermissible purpose.159
As the D.C. Circuit questioned, “If . . .
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation, how
149. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
150. See Jimenez, 605 F.3d at 424.
151. Id.; United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 629-30 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1994).
152. See generally In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing the
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits interpretation of § 3582(a)).
153. See Duran, 37 F.3d at 561.
154. Id.
155. In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d at 859; United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 158 (3d
Cir. 2007).
156. See Manzella, 475 F.3d at 157.
157. Id. at 158.
158. Id.
159. See In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d at 849.
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can more imprisonment serve as an appropriate means of promoting
rehabilitation?”160
III. ANALYSIS
In Tapia v. United States, Justice Kagan authored the opinion for the
Supreme Court, concluding § 3582(a) precludes courts from imposing or
lengthening a sentence for rehabilitative purposes.161 Justice Sotomayor
filed a concurring opinion, to which Justice Alito joined.162 Reversing the
Ninth Circuit, the Court held the district court’s act of lengthening Tapia’s
sentence so she could participate in RDAP was barred by § 3582(a).163 In
her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor questioned whether the district court
had actually violated the proscription set forth in § 3582(a).164
A. MAJORITY OPINION
First, the Supreme Court provided a brief background of the relevant
sentencing provisions.165 In light of this statutory background, the Court
next examined the text of the statute itself.166 Despite finding the statute
clear and unambiguous, the Court also considered how the legislative
history and lack of judicial authority to order treatment affected its textual
reading of the statute.167 Finally, the Court provided guidance to sentencing
courts on how to avoid running afoul of § 3582(a).168
1.

Statutory Background

As an initial matter, the Supreme Court briefly outlined the background
of the relevant sentencing provisions.169 Prior to the enactment of the SRA,
the indeterminate system dominated federal sentencing.170 This system
gave sentencing courts boundless discretion to choose sentences for federal
offenses.171 Once the court determined the minimum sentence for the
offense, the parole board determined how much time the offender would

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (2011).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2392 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2393 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2386 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2388.
Id. at 2391-92.
Id. at 2392-93.
Id. at 2386.
Id.
Id.
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actually serve.172 A good example of how this system operated, the Court
remarked, was the statutes dealing with the punishment of drug
offenders.173 Under these statutes, if a judge found a drug offender was
“likely to be rehabilitated through treatment,” it could confine the offender
for treatment for an indeterminate period of no more than ten years.174
After six months of treatment, the Attorney General could recommend the
offender for early release.175
Due to sentencing disparities and an overwhelming belief that
rehabilitation had failed, indeterminate sentencing fell out of favor.176
Accordingly, Congress enacted the SRA, where it explicitly abandoned
indeterminate sentencing in favor of guideline sentences.177 The Court
concluded the enactment of the SRA was in direct response to the overwhelming perception that rehabilitation could not be reliably induced in the
prison setting.178
After discussing this statutory background, the Court noted sentencing
courts are still required to consider the sentencing factors laid out in §
3553(a), which includes “the need for the sentence . . . to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”179 The Court
clarified, however, that these factors may “apply differently, or even not at
all, depending on the kind of sentence under consideration.”180 For
example, the SRA prohibits courts from imposing a term of supervised
release for retributive purposes.181
2.

Plain Text Analysis

Turning its attention to the statute at issue, the Court proceeded to
conduct a plain text analysis of § 3582(a).182 First, the Court examined the
common definitions of the words “recognize” and “appropriate” in §
3582(a)’s limiting clause.183 The Court concluded the most natural

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 2387 n.3.
Id. at 2387.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2391 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983)).
Id. at 2387.
Id. at 2388.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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definition of “recognize” was to “acknowledge or treat as valid.”184 The
Court also stated something is not “appropriate” if it is not “suitable or
fitting for a particular purpose.”185
Using these definitions to interpret § 3582(a), the Court concluded the
most natural reading of this section “tells courts that they should
acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting
rehabilitation.”186 Invited by the Court as amicus curiae to represent the
government’s position, Professor Stephanos Bibas187 argued “recognizing”
Under his
also means “recall to mind” or “perceive clearly.”188
interpretation of the “recognizing” clause, § 3582(a)’s caveat is nothing
more than a reminder or a guide for sentencing judges’ cognitive
processes.189 The Court rejected amicus’ statutory construction, reasoning a
judge would not sentence a person to a term of imprisonment to promote
rehabilitation if he or she “perceived clearly” that incarceration is an
inappropriate means for doing so.190
Citing United States v. Duran, amicus also contended § 3582(a) only
bars a court’s initial decision to impose a term of imprisonment and does
not apply when a court is determining the length of the sentence because §
3582(a) caveat applies only to “imprisonment,” and imprisonment means
“the act of confining a person.”191 Rejecting this argument, the Court
pointed out the definition of imprisonment is defined as “[t]he state of being
confined” or “a period of confinement.”192 Because the definition did not
distinguish between the decision to incarcerate and the length of incarceration, the Court found § 3582(a)’s limiting language logically applies to
both.193

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. Professor Bibas is a law professor and director of the Supreme Court Clinic at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Stephanos Bibas, PENN LAW, http://www.law.upenn.
edu/cf/faculty/sbibas/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). In addition to teaching Criminal Sentencing,
Bibas has written several articles on the subject. STEPHANOS BIBAS, CURRICULUM VITAE,
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/sbibas/cv.pdf. Bibas has served as Amicus
Curiae on three prior occasions. Id.
188. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 14, at 24.
189. Id.
190. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
191. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 14, at 52.
192. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2389.
193. Id.
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Statutory Context and Legislative History

Although the Court felt the analysis could start and end with the text of
§ 3582(a), the Court bolstered its analysis by examining the statute’s
context and legislative history.194 Citing § 994(k) and § 3582(a), which
directs the Commission and the Court to reject imprisonment as a means of
promoting rehabilitation, the Court emphatically stated “[e]ach actor at each
stage in the sentencing process receives the same message: Do not think
about prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.”195
Moreover, the Court noted Congress did not provide sentencing courts
plenary power to ensure the offender ends up in a facility where rehabilitation services are available, or require the offender to participate in
them.196 The SRA left these decisions within the discretion of the BOP.197
In this context, if a judge can increase the length of the sentence to promote
rehabilitation, an offender can end up with a longer prison term in a facility
that does not provide the offender with needed treatment.198 Even if an
offender has access to rehabilitative programs, the sentencing judge cannot
force an offender to participate in them.199
The Court determined if Congress wanted to consider rehabilitation
when imposing a term of imprisonment, it would have given sentencing
judges the power to ensure the offender participated in rehabilitative
programs.200 For example, unlike the imposition of a term of imprisonment, when a judge is sentencing an offender to either probation or
supervised release, the SRA grants the judge the power to require the
offender to participate in rehabilitative programs.201 In those instances,
Congress explicitly tells sentencing courts to consider rehabilitation as a
factor in imposing these types of sentences.202 This lack of judicial
authority, the Court continued, supported the textual conclusion that
sentencing courts cannot impose or lengthen a term of imprisonment in
order for the offender to participate in correctional programs.203
Finally, the Court, citing the key Senate Report accompanying the
SRA, concluded the legislative history of the SRA suggests Congress was
194. Id. at 2390.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b), (e), (f), 3624(f) (2006); 28 CFR pt. 544, 550 (2010) as
BOP authority over administering inmate educational, recreational, and vocational programs).
197. Id. at 2391.
198. Id. at 2390.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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trying to prevent judges from sentencing offenders to prison because it had
some program that might benefit them.204 In the report, Congress
recognized indeterminate sentencing had resulted in a prisoner’s release
being conflated with the completion of prison treatment programs.205 While
Congress debated at length as to whether rehabilitation should be eliminated completely, Congress refused to take that categorical position.206
Instead, Congress stated, although rehabilitation is an impermissible reason
to sentence an offender to prison, a court may consider rehabilitative
concerns when recommending a facility, or “determining whether a
sanction other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate in a particular
case.”207
As a final argument, amicus contended the rehabilitative model
rejected by the SRA did not include targeted-treatment programs.208
Instead, the rehabilitative ideal was based on the belief that isolation and
hard labor alone could reform an offender.209 The Court also rejected this
argument, stating that prior to the SRA, prison rehabilitation efforts were
focused on educational, vocational, and counseling programs.210 Considering the unambiguous language of the statute, its legislative history, and its
context, the Court held § 3582(a) “prevents a sentencing court from
imposing or lengthening a prison term because the court thinks an offender
will benefit from a prison treatment program.”211
4.

Guidance for Sentencing Courts

In applying the district court’s findings to Tapia’s case, the Supreme
Court proclaimed it did not disapprove of what the sentencing judge was
trying to accomplish.212 The Court noted § 3582(a) does not preclude a
judge from merely discussing what prison rehabilitation programs are
available and their benefits.213 Likewise, a judge can recommend a facility
that has a needed treatment program and encourage an offender to
participate in them.214 But when a sentencing court imposes a lengthier
prison sentence in order for the defendant to be eligible for a correctional
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 2391.
Id.
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1983)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2392.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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program, the court commits error.215 Here, the Court found the judge’s
comments suggested he had calculated Tapia’s sentence length to fifty-one
months so she could qualify for and complete RDAP, which was in
violation of § 3582(a).216 The Court remanded the case for further
reconsideration consistent with its opinion.217
B. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S CONCURRENCE
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the judgment, but expressed her
skepticism that the judge had actually violated § 3582(a)’s prohibition in
this case.218 Justice Sotomayor commented that rehabilitation was only one
of many factors, including deterrence, the district court used to justify
lengthening Tapia’s sentence.219 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor noted that,
at minimum, a thirty-six month sentence would have been sufficient to
qualify Tapia for RDAP.220 Increasing Tapia’s sentence to fifty-one
months would have little effect on Tapia’s eligibility.221 Therefore, Justice
Sotomayor questioned whether the judge based Tapia’s sentence on her
eligibility for RDAP.222 Given the Ninth Circuit’s stance on the issue and
some of the sentencing judge’s comments, Justice Sotomayor conceded it
was unclear whether rehabilitation took precedence in the district court’s
decision.223
IV. IMPACT
Overturning the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court resolved
a longstanding circuit split regarding the interpretation of § 3582(a).224
After Tapia, even if a sentencing court believes the defendant will benefit
from a correctional program, the court cannot impose a term of
imprisonment or lengthen it so that the defendant can participate in the
program.225 While the application of Tapia seems straightforward, courts
have found the line between proper and improper sentencing statements is
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2392-93.
217. Id. at 2393; see also United States v. Tapia, No. 09-50248, 2011 WL 6091308, at *3
(9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2011) (finding on remand the district court committed plain error by selecting a
longer sentence so Tapia could qualify and complete RDAP).
218. Id. at 2393 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 2393-94.
220. Id. at 2394.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1994).
225. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2392.
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not so clear.226 In addition, it is unclear whether Tapia’s scope extends
beyond initial sentencing.227
A. SENTENCING STATEMENTS: WHEN DO THEY GO TOO FAR AND
VIOLATE § 3582(A)?
As a general matter, a talismanic statement such as, “I’ve got to give
[the defendant] that length of time to do the programming and the treatment
and the counselling [sic] . . . that is the reason for [the] sentence,” is a Tapia
error.228 However, a sentencing court’s mere mention of rehabilitation
during a sentencing hearing is not sufficient to constitute an error.229
Whether a sentencing court commits a Tapia error is not always clear.230
As Justice Sotomayor observed during oral argument, sometimes rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation may be intertwined.231 Extrapolating on
this issue, in United States v. Kubeczko,232 the Seventh Circuit concluded
there was no impropriety in a court lengthening a sentence based on the
concern—whether due to mental illness or addiction—that the defendant is
likely to commit further crimes upon release such that a longer sentence is
necessary to protect the public from the defendant’s future offenses.233 To
illustrate its reasoning, the Seventh Circuit posited two hypothetical
sentencing statements:
In one the judge says, “I’m not worried that you’ll commit more
crimes if I gave you a shorter sentence; I am giving you a long
sentence to enable you to obtain psychiatric assistance that will
bring about your complete rehabilitation.” In the other sentencing
statement the judge says, “I am going to sentence you to a sentence
long enough to enable you to obtain psychiatric assistance,
because . . . you can’t control your violent impulses.”234

226. See infra Part IV.A.
227. See infra Part IV.B.
228. United States v. Henderson, 646 F.3d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 2011).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Blackmon, 662 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding “the
district court merely pointed out a mathematical flaw in [defendant’s] request” for a lesser
sentence based on rehabilitative needs, and therefore the sentencing statement did not constitute
plain error).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Kubeczko, 660 F.3d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2011).
231. See Oral Argument at 5:04, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (No.10-5400),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010_10_5400.
232. 660 F.3d 260 (7th Cir. 2011).
233. Kubeczko, 660 F.3d at 262-63.
234. Id. at 262.
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The Seventh Circuit contended the first statement, but not the second,
would violate the statute.235 The Seventh Circuit reasoned the second
statement is permissible because it is based on the defendant’s need for
incapacitation; without treatment, the defendant would continue to be a
danger to the public.236 While the hope the defendant will be rehabilitated
through prison programs is an impermissible consideration, the fact that the
defendant’s problem would make him or her more dangerous would be a
proper consideration.237 This distinction is made even clearer if the judge
indicates he does not think the defendant is interested in rehabilitation, but
believes a longer sentence is necessary “to protect the community, promote
respect for the law, and to provide a just punishment for the offense, all of
which are permissible sentencing considerations under § 3553(a).”238
Nevertheless, if the court unambiguously states that the defendant needs a
longer sentence so he or she can be rehabilitated, the court runs afoul of §
3582(a).239
B. TAPIA’S APPLICATION TO RESENTENCING UPON REVOCATION OF
SUPERVISED RELEASE
While sentencing judges cannot impose or extend a prison sentence so
an offender can benefit from rehabilitative programs,240 it is unclear
whether Tapia’s scope extends beyond the context of initial sentencing.241
Before Tapia, most circuits held that sentencing judges could consider
rehabilitative concerns when imposing a prison term at resentencing upon
revocation of supervised release under § 3583(e), which governs
discretionary revocation.242 After Tapia, some circuits took the opposite
view.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 262-63.
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011).
241. See United States v. Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Breland, 647 F.3d 284, 291 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 282 (9th Cir.
2011).
242. See Molignaro, 649 F.3d at 3 (citing United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir.
2010); United States v. Abeita, 409 F. App’x 2, 4 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thornell, 128
F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d
1091, 1097 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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In United States v. Molignaro,243 the First Circuit held § 3582(a)’s
admonition also applied to post-revocation prison terms.244 In its reasoning,
the First Circuit conceded there were two arguments that made the majority
view persuasive. “First, the dog didn’t bark.”245 In face of constant
litigation on this issue, neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission
amended the statute or took action through their regulatory power.246
Second, it is sensible for Congress to allow courts to give a defendant, who
failed to complete his or her treatment on release, another chance at
treatment, albeit an unpromising one.247 However, the First Circuit found
the congressional intent underlying § 3582(a) overshadowed these
arguments.248 Echoing the reasoning in Tapia, the First Circuit noted
sentencing courts’ “incapacity speaks volumes.”249 Based on its reading of
Tapia, the First Circuit concluded this incapacity trumps the omission of the
limiting language in § 3583(e).250
A few months later, the Fifth Circuit, without addressing Molignaro,
held the plain language of § 3583(e) permits courts to consider rehabilitation when resentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment in
United States v. Breland.251 In affirming the defendant’s sentence, the Fifth
Circuit relied on its prior reasoning in United States v. Giddings.252 In
Giddings, the court recognized § 3583(g), which governs mandatory
revocation of supervised release, did not contain § 3582(a)’s limiting
clause.253 In fact, while § 3583(g) did not require the court to consider a
defendant’s need for rehabilitation, it did not prohibit it either.254 The
Giddings court also noted both § 3583(c), which governs the general
imposition of supervised release, and § 3583(e) specifically require the
court to consider rehabilitation.255
Equally compelling, the Giddings court pointed out that a sentencing
judge is not imposing a new term of imprisonment at resentencing.256 Upon
revocation, the sentencing judge is merely requiring the defendant to serve
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

649 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011).
Molignaro, 649 F.3d at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. (citing Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390-91 (2011)).
Id. at 5.
647 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2011).
37 F.3d 1091 (5th Cir. 1994).
Giddings, 37 F.3d at 1094-95.
See id. at 1095.
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the rest of his or her supervised release in prison.257 Because a court must
consider rehabilitative factors when imposing a term of supervised release,
it follows that, upon revocation, courts can consider these factors so the
term of imprisonment corresponds with the purposes of the original
sentence.258
After reviewing the reasoning in Giddings, the Fifth Circuit in Breland
also noted nothing in the Tapia opinion suggested its holding would apply
to revocation of supervised release.259 Rather, the Fifth Circuit pointed out
the Supreme Court cited § 3583 as a provision that does allow courts to
consider rehabilitative factors.260 Given the uniform interpretation of §
3583(e) among the circuits and the plain language of the statute, the Fifth
Circuit saw no reason to read § 3583(e) any differently from § 3583(g).261
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held § 3582(a) does not preclude a court from
considering rehabilitation when resentencing upon revocation of supervised
release.262
Recently joining the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Grant263 found sentencing courts’ incapacity to place a defendant in a
particular prison or force the defendant to join a BOP program outweighed
the Fifth Circuit’s “cross-referencing” argument. Looking at the language
of § 3582(a), the Ninth Circuit concluded the section “appears to embrace
all sentences of imprisonment.”264 Based on this reasoning, the Ninth
Circuit held a prison term, whether imposed at initial sentencing or upon
revocation of supervised release, can only be imposed or lengthened based
on retributive, deterrence, or incapacitation rationales.265 Although the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a sentencing judge may rightfully believe
a prison sentence has rehabilitative benefits, “those benefits cannot be the
reason for imposing it.”266
V. CONCLUSION
In Tapia, the Supreme Court held § 3582(a)’s prohibition against
considering rehabilitation applies both to the decision to incarcerate and to

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 1095 n.15.
Id.
United States v. Breland, 647 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. (citing Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (2011)).
Id.
Id.
664 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 2011).
Grant, 664 F.3d at 281.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
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the determination of the length of the prison term.267 While the Court did
not disapprove of Tapia’s sentence, the Court held the sentencing judge
went too far in selecting the term of imprisonment to ensure participation in
the 500-Hour Drug program.268 With its holding, the Supreme Court ended
the long-running practice of lengthening a defendant’s sentence so he or she
could participate in correctional programs.269 After this decision, if a
defendant shows the district court committed a Tapia error, the defendant
may be entitled to resentencing.270 Although Tapia clearly applies to initial
sentencing, the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have differing views on
Tapia’s application to resentencing upon revocation of supervised
release.271 If the Supreme Court grants certiorari and finds its Tapia
holding applies to revocation of supervised release, arguments that a
defendant needs a second chance at rehabilitation in prison would no longer
be a valid reason for incarceration.272
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267. See generally United States v. Censke, No. 09-2385, 2011 WL 6005199, at *14 (6th
Cir. Dec. 2, 2011) (discussing the practice of courts lengthening defendant’s sentences so they can
qualify for BOP specialized programs).
268. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011).
269. Id. at 2393.
270. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, No. 09-50248, 2011 WL 6091308, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec.
8, 2011) (holding Tapia was entitled to resentencing after she establishing the district court’s
Tapia error was plain); Censke, 2011 WL 6005199 at *14-15 (vacating and remanding for
resentencing because defendant established district court abused its discretion by lengthening the
defendant’s sentence based on his need for medical and psychological treatment).
271. See supra Part IV.B.
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